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Separation of powers among the three branches of government is a
fundamental and defining characteristic of American democracy both at
the federal and state levels of government. The idea of separation of pow-
ers did not exist in Britain where the monarch could appoint judges yet
dismiss them at will, a style of governance that ran contrary to the idea of a
democracy.' A system of checks and balances ensures equilibrium among
the coequal branches, and it prevents encroachment of one branch of gov-
ernment into the vested constitutional sphere of another because
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition."' Under the political
question doctrine, the actions of a coequal branch of government's actions
are deemed political as long as it acts in accordance with its constitutionally
vested powers. When the branches act within their sphere of powers, con-
flicts do not arise. The problem, however, is when one branch attempts to
encroach into the sphere of another branch. The issue then becomes how
to resolve the conflict when one branch goes beyond their sphere of consti-
tutional power.
In re Hooker centered on the now-infamous pardons granted by Mis-
sissippi Governor Haley Barbour on his final day in office.' Those pardons
led Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood to bring suit against all
pardonees, alleging that the pardons were unconstitutional-in violation of
Article 5, Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution.' Section 124 states
that "after conviction no pardon shall be granted until the [pardon] appli-
cant therefor [sic] shall have published for thirty days .... The trial court
granted a temporary restraining order requiring "[parolees] to appear at a
preliminary injunction hearing."' However, the Mississippi Supreme Court
granted the parolees' petition "for permission to file an interlocutory ap-
peal."' In their opinion, the In re Hooker majority conceded that the pub-
lication requirements stated in section 124 are a constitutional prerequisite
* J.D., Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., Political Science, Miami University (Ohio).
Mr. Smith extends his appreciation to Professor Donald E. Campbell for his invaluable guidance and
feedback given during the drafting of this Note. Finally, he would like to thank his friends and family
for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
3. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012).
4. Id.
5. Miss. CONST. art. V, § 124 (1890).
6. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 403.
7. Id.
531
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
for a valid pardon.' Nevertheless, the court ultimately upheld the pardons
concluding that the judicial branch lacked the constitutional authority to
void a pardon issued by the governor-as the head of the coequal execu-
tive branch.' The Hooker majority was "compelled to hold that ... it fell to
the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution's publication re-
quirement was met.""o In essence, the Mississippi Supreme Court deemed
Governor Barbour's actions political in nature and nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine.
This Note will examine the concerns and implications of the judiciary
branch by broadening the political question doctrine in In re Hooker and
essentially abdicating its constitutionally vested obligation to interpret the
law to the executive branch. Part II summarizes the relevant facts of In re
Hooker. Part III addresses the background and history of the law including
both federal law and Mississippi precedent in relation to the political ques-
tion and separation of powers doctrines. Finally, Part IV, as exemplified by
In re Hooker, analyzes the unprecedented implications of state judiciaries
misinterpreting and broadening the political question doctrine to the extent
it creates an imbalance between the three branches of government.
II. FACTS
In the final days of his governorship, Mississippi Governor Haley Bar-
bour "granted executive clemency to 215 persons, most of whom were no
longer in custody."" However, twenty-six of the pardonees remained in
custody. Governor Barbour "granted ten [individuals] full pardons."1 2
The ten received pardons were "full, complete, and unconditional . . . .
The ten pardonees were convicted of crimes including murder; statutory
rape; aggravated assault; accessory after-the-fact to murder and armed
carjacking; illegal drug possession; armed robbery; and burglary." Five of
the ten pardonees served as trusties at the Mississippi Governor's Mansion
during Barbour's governorship, and four out the five mansion trusties were
convicted murderers.15 The Mississippi "'trusty' system . . . allows well-
behaved prisoners to clean, cook and do other chores at the governor's
mansion."" While pardoning trusties at the governor's mansion was politi-
cally unpopular, there was no dispute that the Governor had authority and
8. Id. at 403, 412.
9. Id. at 403, 414.
10. Id. at 403.
11. Id.
12. Id. Among the remaining sixteen individuals in custody, Governor Barbour granted "thir-
teen medical releases; one suspension of sentence; one conditional, indefinite suspension of sentence;
and one conditional clemency." Id.
13. Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401 (Miss. 2012) (No. 2012-IA-
00166-SCT), 2012 MS S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4, at *7.
14. Id. at *4-5.
15. Id. at *11-13.
16. Alyssa Newcomb & Huma Khan, Mississippi Pardons Issued by Gov. Haley Barbour Chal-




discretion to pardon these individuals." The legal question asserted by the
Mississippi Attorney General was whether the pardons were in violation of
Article 5, Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution and, therefore, uncon-
stitutional and void."
Specifically, General Hood believed that the pardons violated Section
124's requirement that pardon applicants "publish a petition stating why
the pardon should be granted."" So, in the Circuit Court of the First Judi-
cial District of Hinds County, General Hood filed a civil suit, arguing that
the ten full pardons violated Section 124 and requested the circuit judge to
declare the pardons "null, void, and unenforceable."2 0 Governor Barbour
entered the case as a friend of the court.' During the trial court proceed-
ings, Mississippi "filed a Second Amended Complaint that added [Bar-
bour's successor and] current [Mississippi] Governor Phil Bryant as a
defendant . . . ." However, Governor Barbour was "[u]naware of the
amended complaint . .. [and] filed a motion for leave to file an am icus
curiae brief, citing the absence of . . . Bryant as a reason that his involve-
ment in the suit was necessary."
A temporary restraining order was issued by the circuit judge that re-
quired all ten pardonees to "provide the court 'sufficient proof [of publica-
tion] consistent with Section 124.' "2 Also, pursuant to the temporary
restraining order, the Mississippi Department of Corrections could not re-
lease any of the pardonees until the circuit court was provided with "suffi-
cient proof of acceptable Section 124 publication."' 5  The temporary
restraining order was extended and the pardonees were ordered to appear
before the circuit judge for a "preliminary injunction hearing.""2 The
pardonees filed a petition with the Mississippi Supreme Court seeking
"permission to file an interlocutory appeal."' The Mississippi Supreme
Court granted the pardoners's petition.2 Also, the Mississippi Supreme
Court stayed all the circuit court proceedings and ordered that the tempo-
rary restraining order remain effective until the court rendered a
decision."
17. See Richard Fausset, Outgoing Gov. Haley Barbour's Pardons Shock Mississippi, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/nation/la-na-b arbour-pardons-20120113; Judy
Keen, Barbour's Pardons Stir Outrage in Mississippi, USA TODAY ( Jan. 13, 2012), http:/usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-12/mississippi-barbour-pardons/52511486/1.
18. NEWCOMB & KHAN, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 403.
21. Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Justices Hear Arguments on Pardons, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/us/politics/mississippi-justices-hear-argu-
ments-on-barbours-pardons.html?_r=0.
22. Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 13, at *10 n.6.
23. Id.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The United States Constitution: Federal Separation of Powers
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal govern-
ment operate through a system of checks and balances.30 In Federalist
Number 48, James Madison argued that one branch of government "ought
[not] to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the
other[] [branches], in the administration of their respective powers."
Under the United States Constitution, the legislative power is vested in the
United States Congress; the executive power is vested with the President;
and the judicial power is vested with the judiciary branch.
Furthermore, "that power [of each of the three coequal branches of
government] is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually
restrained from passing the limits assigned to it." Therefore, for example,
as a check on Congress's legislative power, the President is vested with the
power to veto legislation passed by Congress. 34 However, Congress can
override the President's veto with two-thirds vote of each house. 5 Also,
the President is constitutionally vested with the power to appoint judges to
the federal bench with lifetime tenure.3 ' Nevertheless, the House of Rep-
resentatives has the power to bring articles of impeachment against either
the President or federal judges while the Senate has the power to try im-
peachment proceedings.
B. 1890 Mississippi Constitution: State Separation of Powers
1. Separation of Powers
Mississippi's current Constitution was adopted in 1890, which struc-
tures the Mississippi government to parallel the federal government with
three coequal branches. 3 1 In article I, section 1, of the 1890 Mississippi
Constitution, "[t]he powers of the government of the state of Mississippi
shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided
to a separate [constitutional sphere], to-wit: those which are legislative to
one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to
another." 3 9 Furthermore, article II, section 1, of the 1890 Mississippi Con-
stitution provides:
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1: U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1: U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5: U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 7.
38. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 404.
39. Miss. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1890).
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No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging
to one of these departments, shall exercise any power prop-
erly belonging to either of the others. The acceptance of an
office in either of said departments shall, of itself, and at
once, vacate any and all offices held by the person so ac-
cepting in either of the other departments.40
2. The Mississippi Governor's Vested Pardoning Power
Under the 1890 Constitution, the pardon power is vested solely with
the governor."1 Article V, section 124, addresses both reprieves and par-
dons to be issued by the governor, but, more importantly lays out certain
criteria that must be met for the governor to issue a valid pardon.1 Section
124 states:
In all criminal and penal cases, excepting those of treason
and impeachment, the governor shall have power to grant
reprieves and pardons . . . but no pardon shall be granted
before conviction; and in cases of felony, after conviction no
pardon shall be granted until the applicant therefor shall
have published for thirty days, in some newspaper in the
county where the crime was committed, and in case there be
no newspaper published in said county, then in an adjoining
county, his petition for pardon, setting forth therein the rea-
sons why such pardon should be granted."
The drafters included the publication requirement to ensure the Gov-
ernor did not abuse the pardoning power."4 They deliberately added the
publication requirement. 5 The requirement was not included in prior Mis-
sissippi Constitutions, allowing Governors to abuse their pardon powers."
The drafters of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution believed "'the Governor
be not a man to be trusted.'"'' The purpose of the publication require-
ment was to make the pardoning process more transparent, which would
subject a governor's pardon actions to public scrutiny and consideration."
It was essential to provide notice to those communities potentially affected
by an impending pardon, and prevent governors from issuing controversial
eleventh-hour pardons that lacked notice.' 9 Accordingly, the publication
40. Miss. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1890).
41. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 412.
42. Miss. CONST. art. V, § 124 (1890).
43. Id.
44. Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 13, at *28.
45. Id. at *28.
46. Id. at *28-*29.
47. Id. at *28 (quoting Amasa M. Eaton, Recent State Constitutions, 6 HARv. L. REV. 109, 117-18
(1892) (discussing Mississippi 1890 Constitution)).
48. Id. at *30.
49. Id. at *31.
2014] 535
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
requirement was intended to place a constitutional prerequisite to the gov-
ernor issuing a pardon.
C. Separation of Powers and the Political Question Doctrines: Federal
In Marburv v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously and affirma-
tively confirmed the powers of the judiciary as a coequal branch within the
federal government, and he also addressed the notion of the judiciary con-
sidering matters that would be political in nature.o In Marbury, during the
waning days of his presidency, President John Adams nominated William
Marbury as a justice of the peace for Washington, D.C.5 ' He was con-
firmed by the Senate.5 His commission was signed by President Adams
with his Secretary of State, John Marshall, sealing it with the seal of the
United States.5 ' However, James Madison, the Secretary of State of Presi-
dent Adams's successor, refused to deliver the commissions.54 Therefore,
Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel
Madison to deliver his commission. 5 The Court held that the commissions
were valid when they were signed by John Adams.5' However, the Court
ruled the matter was outside the Court's original jurisdiction because Con-
gress did not have the authority to alter the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction stated in the U.S. Constitution.
In addressing judicial power versus executive power, Chief Justice
Marshall noted that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is."5 However, Marshall did recognize
the possibility that a conflict could arise among the three branches that
would be beyond the capacity of the courts to resolve.5 1 In addressing ex-
ecutive actions, Marshall unequivocally states that "[t]he province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how
the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
discretion.""o Marshall defined the type of questions that are beyond the
scope of judicial review as those classified as "political:" "[q]uestions, in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted
to the executive, can never be made in this Court."" Marshall was assert-
ing that as long as the executive branch was adhering to its constitutionally
vested powers, then executive branch actions would be deemed political
and nonjusticiable. Marshall's statement was the advent of the political
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 177 (1803).





56. Id. at 155.
57. Id. at 172-79.
58. Id. at 177.





question doctrine that the Supreme Court expounded on in the 1962 case
Baker v. Carr. 1
Baker concerned a constitutional challenge to a Tennessee state appor-
tionment statute alleging that it violated voters' constitutional due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.6 In addressing the justiciability of Tennessee apportionment in rela-
tion to the political question doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court laid out
several instances where a legal issue would be nonjusticiable."
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a polit-
ical question is found a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of decid-
ing without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political de-
cision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question. 5
The Baker Court held that absent any of these limitations a case should not
be dismissed citing nonjusticiability for the presence of a political ques-
tion.6 6 Essentially, the judiciary "cannot reject as 'no law suit' a [genuine]
controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds con-
stitutional authority."17 Furthermore, Nixon v. United States"8 illustrates
how the political question doctrine continues to affect U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence.' 9
Nixon centered on a federal district court judge who was impeached
by the United States House of Representatives when he failed to resign
after being convicted of perjury.o In Nixon, the U.S. Senate commenced
Judge Nixon's impeachment trial pursuant to U.S. Senate Rule XI, "under
which the presiding officer appoints a committee of Senators to 'receive
evidence and take testimony. "7' After the testimony, the committee of
Senators "presented the full Senate with a complete transcript of the pro-
ceeding and a [r]eport stating the uncontested facts and summarizing the
62. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
63. Id. at 186-88.
64. Id. at 217-18.
65. Id. at 217.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
69. Id. at 228.
70. Id. at 226-28.
71. Id. at 227.
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evidence on the contested facts."71 The judge was eventually convicted and
removed by the full Senate." After his Senate conviction, Nixon brought
suit "arguing that Senate Rule XI violate[d] the constitutional grant of au-
thority to the Senate to 'try' all impeachments [pursuant to Article I, Sec-
tion 3, Clause 6, of the U.S. Constitution]."" In sum, he argued that he
was entitled to a trial before the full Senate, not before a Senate
75committee.
The Supreme Court held that "[i]f courts may review the actions of the
Senate in order to determine whether that body 'tried' an impeached offi-
cial, it is difficult to see how the Senate would be 'functioning . . . indepen-
dently and without assistance or interference." 7 ' The Supreme Court is
not constitutionally vested to participate in impeachment proceedings.
The Nixon Court stressed that "[j]udicial involvement in impeachment pro-
ceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, [was] counterintuitive
because it would eviscerate the 'important constitutional check' placed on
the Judiciary by the Framers."7' Accordingly, in Nixon, the Senate's actions
raised a political question and were nonjusticiable because the Senate did
not "transgress[ ] [its] identifiable textual limit[ ]" in the Constitution to try
all impeachments."
In sum, the Supreme Court has recognized that questions are "politi-
cal" and beyond the scope of judicial consideration when: (a) "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department""o is evident like, as in Nixon, the U.S. Senate is constitu-
tionally vested to try all impeachments;" or (b) there is "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,"8" which was not
the case in Marbury where the U.S. Constitution's grant of original jurisdic-
tion to Supreme Court prevented Marshal from compelling Madison to de-
liver Marbury's commission." Matters of national security and foreign
policy are also considered political questions." There is an external versus
internal dichotomy embedded within the political question doctrine. When
a branch of government acts in accordance with its constitutionally vested
powers, its actions are deemed political and the branch's internal opera-
tions are nonjusticiable. However, if a branch of government exceeds its
grant of constitutional authority then its actions become subject to judicial
review. This exact sentiment is echoed through Mississippi jurisprudence.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 228.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 228-29.
76. Id. at 231.
77. Id. at 233-34.
78. Id. at 235.
79. Id. at 228, 238.
80. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
81. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
82. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
83. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 172-79.
84. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-14.
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D. Separation of Powers and the Political Question Doctrines:
Mississippi Precedent
1. Legislative Authority
Even in cases preceding the adoption of the 1890 Mississippi Constitu-
tion, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that matters concerning a coequal
branch's compliance with constitutional provisions that regulate that
branch are nonjusticiable.15 In Ex Parte W.V. Wren, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court said that "[t]he sound view ... is to regard all of the provi-
sions of the constitution as mandatory, and those regulating the legislative
[and executive branches] as addressed to and mandatory to [those
branches], and with which the courts have nothing to do . . . ."" In other
words, the actions are characterized as political in nature in the same man-
ner as in federal courts.
Ex Parte W.V. Wren concerned a traveling salesman for a New Orle-
ans grocer who was "exhibiting goods and soliciting and obtaining orders
for like goods on behalf" of the grocer in Jackson, Mississippi." However,
the salesman was arrested under Mississippi law for failing to pay a privi-
lege tax that was placed "on each person traveling and selling goods or
merchandise by sample or otherwise in [Mississippi]."" After his arrest,
the salesman obtained a writ of habeas corpus and alleged that the statute
he was arrested under was unconstitutional because the act that the gover-
nor signed was not the bill passed by both houses of the legislature." The
part of the act at issue was the absence of amendment 34, "that part of the
bill which imposed the tax for the non-payment of which petitioner was
arrested," from the act the governor signed.90 Under the Mississippi Con-
stitution, once a bill passes both houses of the legislature it must "be signed
by the president of the Senate and the speaker of the house of representa-
tives in open session" before it is presented to the governor for his or her
signature.91 Therefore, the salesman urged the Mississippi Supreme Court
to consult the legislative journals of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate.
The salesman in Ex Parte Wren asserted that "the adjudged law of
[Mississippi] . . . is only prima facie evidence that the act was enacted and
that the journals may be consulted, and if from the journal it appears that
the act did not pass, it must on that evidence be declared void."93 The
Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the governor's signature
"is the sole expositor of its contents and the conclusive evidence of its exis-
tence according to its purport, and that it is not allowable to look further to
85. Ex Parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 533-34 (1886).
86. Id. at 534.
87. Id. at 512.
88. Id. at 512-13.
89. Id. at 513-15.
90. Id. at 527-28.
91. Id. at 514.
92. Id. at 514-15.
93. Id. at 522.
2014] 539
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discover the history of the act or ascertain its provisions."" This view "is
the simplest, the surest to avoid errors and difficulties, in accord with the
constitution, and supported by an array of authority and a cogency of argu-
ment that commands [the court's] fullest assent."9 5 After all, the legisla-
ture is a coequal branch of government, "possessing all legislative power
and not subject to supervision and control during its performance of its
constitutional functions, nor to judicial revision . . . ."" Nevertheless, the
Mississippi Supreme Court "should not shrink from declaring an act of the
legislature enacted precisely in the mode prescribed by the constitution
void if its provisions violate [the constitution] . . . ."" The Mississippi Su-
preme Court's political question jurisprudence towards legislative actions
was also reflected in Hunt v. Wright."
Wright concerned a suit brought by the appellant alleging that a reve-
nue bill enacted by the legislature was unconstitutional." One of claims
for unconstitutionality was that the bill was passed "within the last five days
of the [legislative] session . . . ."100 Section 68 of the Mississippi Constitu-
tion says "that no appropriation or revenue bill shall be passed during the
last five days of [a legislative] session."o0 The court held that "section 68 is
obligatory on the legislature, its disregard of it is beyond the reach of
courts, which are not keepers of the consciences of legislators, and deal
only with what they do, and not what they should have done or omit-
ted."10 2 Simply put, the Wright court adopted and echoed the Wren prece-
dent where the legislative branch is a coequal branch of the government
and vested with the legislative power.o 3 The legislative branch "is not sub-
ject to supervision and revision by the courts as to those rules of procedure
prescribed by the constitution for its observance . . . ."1'0 Again, the judici-
ary "cannot explore legislative journals to see if all the directions of the
constitution were observed, but must accept as legislative enactments, duly
passed as prescribed by the constitution, all such acts as are duly authenti-
cated as such in the mode prescribed by it."105 The Wright decision paral-
lels the court's holding in Lang v. Board of Supervisors.106
Lang stemmed from a claim brought by appellant that a bill enacted
by the Legislature was unconstitutional "because of the failure of the
94. Id. at 529.
95. Id. at 532.
96. Id. at 533-34.
97. Id. at 535.
98. Hunt v. Wright, 11 So. 608 (Miss. 1892).
99. Id. at 608-09.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 610.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 609.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lang v. Bd. of Supervisors, 75 So. 126 (Miss 1917).
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[bill's] title to sufficiently indicate the subject-matter of the legisla-
tion . . . ."1'0 Section 71 of the Mississippi Constitution requires "[e]very
bill introduced into the legislature shall have a title, and the tile ought to
indicate clearly the subject-matter or matters of the proposed legisla-
tion."1 08 In Lang, the court said "'Ought' is a shade stronger than 'should',
but 'a shade is not to be seized to nullify an act of the Legislature.' "0' At
its core, the court also held that "an act without a title would not be a law"
yet also held that the "sufficiency of the title is a question solely for the
Legislature." 0 Aside from legislative actions, the political question doc-
trine applies equally to actions of the executive branch.
2. Executive Authority
In State v. McPhail,"' the court held that a governor's exercise of ex-
ecutive authority "must be within the Constitution and the laws [of Missis-
sippi], and the facts must be such as to uphold or justify the exercise of the
official authority which in a given case is exerted." 1 1  However, the gover-
nor's actions would be subject to judicial review in an "attempt to exercise
an authority not legally vested in him." 1 In McPhail, intoxicating liquors
and rampant gambling were causing "East Jackson, Rankin County, Missis-
sippi" to become a lawless society."' So, "[o]n December 8, 1936, the
Governor issued an executive order . .. deemed necessary to send therein a
sufficient detachment of the national guard of the state 'for the purpose of
assisting in the enforcement of the criminal laws of [Mississippi] .... 1
After the detachment of the National Guard, a justice of the peace issued a
search warrant for an officer of the National Guard to search the appellee's
business.1 16
On executing the search warrant, the guardsman seized a sizeable
"quantity of intoxicating liquors ... and much other evidence was obtained
of violations of the law in keeping with the stated conditions .... The
district attorney brought suit against the appellee's business for being a
common nuisance.11 8 However, the chancery court dismissed the charges
citing that the "facts were not sufficient to authorize the interference of the
[National Guard]" and that the evidence was illegally obtained. 9 Missis-
sippi appealed to the supreme court.
120
107. Id. at 128.
108. Miss. CONST. art. IV, §71.
109. Lang, 75 So. at 128.
110. Id.
111. State v. Mcphail, 180 So. 387 (Miss. 1938).
112. Id. at 391.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 388-89.
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In McPhail, the Mississippi Supreme Court "deal[t] solely with the
constitutional and statutory powers of the Governor, and of the militia, in
the execution of the laws."1 12 The court said that the essential feature of
the Mississippi Constitution "is that primary local authority shall be pre-
served, so far as practically possible." However, the court noted that the
framers of the Mississippi Constitution foresaw "that for one cause or an-
other, local conditions would sometimes . . . render the local authorities
powerless to enforce the laws . . . ." Accordingly, the governor, being
head of the executive branch of government and constitutionally vested
with executing the laws, could "act, in case of need, for the whole state."112
Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded the chancery court
holding that "the Governor was within his constitutional and statutory
power in sending the [National Guard to East Jackson] . . ., and that in
consequence the [guardsman] were lawful civil officers within that area."
Nonetheless, the McPhail court did acknowledge that some of the gover-
nor's actions "are of purely political concern" and "no writ of injunction or
mandamus or other judicial remedial writ will run against the [g]overnor"
unless his actions infringe an individual's personal or property right. 1 6 By
extension, the governor executing his constitutionally vested power to issue
pardons is purely political, which is reinforced by the court's ruling in
Montgomery v. Cleveland.1 21
Cleveland was appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court "from a
judgment in habeas corpus discharging the appellee, Walter Cleveland,
from the State Penitentiary ..... P Cleveland was granted a pardon by
then Mississippi Lieutenant Governor, H. H. Casteel, while then Missis-
sippi Governor, Lee. M. Russell, was out of the state. * Cleveland "had
properly published and filed in the Office of the Governor of the state a
petition praying that he be granted a pardon for the offense of which he
had been convicted . . . .. 130 However, the superintendent of the State
Penitentiary refused to recognize the Lt. Governor's pardon. 13  As the ap-
pellant, the superintendent argued that, pursuant to section 131 of the Mis-
sissippi Constitution, the Lt. Governor could only discharge the duties,
which does not include the grants of pardons because that is a discretionary
power vested with the Governor.1 3 2
121. Id.
122. Id. at 390.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 392.
126. Id. at 391.
127. Montgomery v. Cleveland, 98 So. 111, 112 (Miss. 1923).
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However, the supreme court held that "powers" versus "duties" are
interchangeable.13 3 In short, the court held that the Lt. Governor was
vested with the duties of the Office of the Governor to pardon Cleveland
while the Governor was out of the state. 1 34 The court acknowledges that
governor "is the sole judge of the sufficiency of the facts and of the propri-
ety of granting the pardon [pursuant to section 124 of the Mississippi Con-
stitution], and no other department of the government has any control over
his acts or discretion in such matters." 1 35 The Cleveland court's sentiment
pertaining to the governor's vested pardoning power under section 124 was
echoed in Pope v. Wiggins.136
Wiggins was a habeas corpus proceeding where the appellant, Pope,
alleged he was being denied due process of law because his suspension of
sentence was revoked by the governor without notice and the opportunity
to be heard. 13 ' The court held that "the petitioner offered no proof to
show that his behavior had been good between the date of the second sus-
pension of his sentence . . . and the subsequent revocation . . . .. 13 The
petitioner's suspension was conditioned that the governor may revoke it
for any reason without notice. 13  When Pope accepted the suspension, he
accepted the conditions of his suspension. 140 Therefore, the governor's rea-
son of Pope's subsequent murder conviction was sufficient to revoke his
suspended sentence.14' The court affirmed the denying of petitioner's
writ.14 2 With respect to section 124, the court asserted that "the power to
grant pardons and to otherwise extend clemency, after the judicial process
whereby one has been convicted of crime has come to an end, is vested in
the governor alone."14 3 The Wiggins court reasoned that the governor's
pardon "power is not limited by any other provision of the [Mississippi]
Constitution, nor can the same be limited or restricted by either of the
other two principal departments of the state government in the absence of
a constitutional amendment so authorizing."14 4 Again, issues concerning
whether another coequal branch of government exercised their constitu-
tionally vested powers are nonjusticiable where the actions are within an
express grant of constitutional authority. In any event, as evident with the
McPhail, Cleveland, Wiggins, Wright, and Lang holdings, Ex Parte Wren
continues to govern and to serve as a guiding force for Mississippi
precedent.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id. at 114.
136. Pope v. Wiggins, 69 So. 2d 913, 915 (Miss. 1954).
137. Id. at 913-14.
138. Id. at 914.
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3. The Scope of Mississippi's Political Question Doctrine Jurisprudence
Mississippi appears to abide by the Marbury principle that as long as
coequal branches act pursuant to their explicit grant of constitutional au-
thority then their actions are nonjusticiable."4 Their actions are "politi-
cal," which does not subject their internal procedural operations to judicial
review. Although, one caveat to Mississippi's political question jurispru-
dence, as evident in Wright, it appears that the Mississippi Supreme Court
misinterpreted the political question doctrine to read explicit constitutional
limitations to a branch's constitutional authority out of the Mississippi
Constitution and characterize them as procedural matters.' Nevertheless,
a coordinate political branch's actions become subject to judicial review
when it exceeds or transgresses its textually committed constitutional
authority.
E. Mississippi Supreme Court Looks West to Wyoming for
Pardon Interpretation
Iz re Moore,1 47 a case from the Wyoming Supreme Court, was con-
sulted because the Mississippi Supreme Court had "no previous case on
point concerning" the particular pardon issue presented in hI re Hooker.14 1
It concerned a "petition for the writ of habeas corpus, and for a discharge
of the petitioner from imprisonment" for grand larceny.14' Despite receiv-
ing a pardon from the governor, the petitioner continued to be incarcer-
ated because of insufficient notice of his pardon application.15 0 Under the
Wyoming Constitution, the governor is vested with the pardoning power
"but the legislature may by law regulate the manner in which the remis-
sions of fines, pardons, commutations, and reprieves may be applied
for."15 ' Article 4, section 5 of the Wyoming Constitution states:
The governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeit-
ures, to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after
conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of im-
peachment; but the legislature may by law regulate the man-
ner in which the remission of fines, pardons, commutations
and reprieves may be applied for. Upon conviction for trea-
son he shall have power to suspend the execution of sen-
tence until the case is reported to the legislature at its next
regular session, when the legislature shall either pardon, or
commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence
145. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
146. Hunt v. Wright, 11 So. 608, 610 (Miss. 1892).
147. In re Moore, 31 P. 980 (Wyo. 1893).
148. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 413 (Miss. 2012).





or grant further reprieve. He shall communicate to the legis-
lature at each regular session each case of remission of fine,
reprieve, commutation or pardon granted by him, stating
the name of the convict, the crime for which he was con-
victed, the sentence and its date, and the date of the remis-
sion, commutation, pardon or reprieve with his reasons for
granting the same.1 5 '
However, the Wyoming Supreme Court said that this language does
not regulate or "limit the authority or jurisdiction of the governor." 1 5  The
court classified the statutory publishing notice provisions enacted in 1869154
as a "directory to applicants for pardons, and those moving in their be-
half . . . ." However, the governor could "grant a pardon upon his
knowledge, and upon his own motion, without any application or hear-
ing."1 5 ' All in all, In re Moore concerned the Wyoming Governor's juris-
diction in issuing pardons, which the court "cannot inquire whether the
pardoning power has been exercised judiciously, or whether the proceed-
ings preliminary to the granting of the pardon were irregular, if any such
were necessary."15 7
IV. IN RE HOOKER
A. Majority
Justice Dickinson, Presiding Justice for the Mississippi Supreme Court,
wrote the majority opinion.1 5 1 In the beginning of his opinion, Justice
Dickinson stresses that In re Hooker is a case about separation of powers
and "not about whether the governor [of Mississippi] is above the law,"
which, the court stresses, he is not.15 9 The Mississippi Supreme Court "has
the constitutional duty to interpret the content of laws passed by the [Mis-
sissippi] Legislature and executive orders issued by the governor . . . ."10
However, the Mississippi Supreme Court (hereinafter "court") cannot as-
sume "the absolute power to police the branches of government in fulfilling
their constitutional duties to produce laws and executive orders, unless
there is alleged a justiciable violation of a personal right."'
During oral arguments, Attorney General Hood was unable "to point
out any pardon [issued by Governor Barbour] that was not facially valid"
152. WYo. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
153. In re Moore, 31 P. at 980.
154. Rev. St. Wyo. T. §§ 3367-70.
155. In re Moore, 31 P. at 981.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 982.
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under Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution.1 12 A facially valid par-
don was a pardon that appeared valid on its face and where the only thing
missing was the thirty-day publication requirement.' Therefore, Justice
Dickinson argued that "the controlling issue [was] whether the judicial
branch of government has constitutional authority to void a facially-valid
pardon issued by the coequal executive branch, where the only challenge is
compliance with Section 124's publication requirement." 6 ' Thus, the court
was "compelled to hold-that in each of the cases before [the court]-it fell to
the governor alone to decide whether the [Mississippi] Constitution's publi-
cation requirement was met. "165 The court reversed and rendered the Cir-
cuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County and rendered
judgment to dismiss Attorney General Hood's Second Amended Com-
plaint "and this action as barred by the doctrine of separation of
powers. 1 66
Relying on Marbury v. Madison, the majority argued that both the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have "refused to
exercise jurisdiction over a matter when there was a 'textually demonstra-
ble constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment . . . ."16' Therefore, "according to Marbury and its progeny, cases
and controversies involving interpretation and adjudication of constitu-
tional provisions that are textually committed to another branch of govern-
ment are nonjusticiable."1 6 ' The majority argues that the "Marbury and its
progeny" precedent has been adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court.16 1
Referring to McPhail, the majority noted that "executive action must
fall within the Constitution and [the] laws of [Mississippi], and the facts
must be such as to uphold or justify the exercise of the official authority
exercised."o However, the majority stressed the awareness of political
questions because "some [executive] actions are of 'a purely political na-
ture . . . .'"" Furthermore, the majority asserted that 'no writ of injunc-
tion or mandamus or other judicial remedial writ will run against the
governor' unless personal or private property rights are interfered wit/.'
The majority held that this was not the case in In re Hooker because the
attorney general's claims were brought "on behalf of the State of Missis-
sippi, and no particular individual."" Therefore, the exercise of the gover-
nor's pardon power "is of 'a purely political nature."'
162. Id.
163. Id. at 414.
164. Id. at 403 (emphasis omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 414.
167. Id. at 405.
168. Id. at 406.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 411 (citing State v. Mcphail, 180 So. 387, 391 (Miss. 1938)).
171. Id. (quoting McPhail, 180 So. at 391).
172. Id. (quoting McPhail, 180 So. at 391).
173. Id. at 411-412.
174. Id. at 412 (quoting McPhail, 180 So. at 391).
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Under Cleveland, the court held "that the governor [i]s the sole judge
of the sufficiency of the facts of the propriety of granting the par-
don .... However, although the court acknowledged that pardon ap-
plicants are held to Section 124's publication requirements, "the courts may
not investigate the inner workings of other branches of government to de-
termine whether those procedural requirements were met. "176 Again, the
court reiterates that the doctrine of nonjusticiability is applicable to In re
Hooker because Section 124's publication requirement for pardon appli-
cants "is not any particular individual's personal or property right. 1 77
Relying on Wright, the court stated that the judicial branch is not the
keeper of the Mississippi executive branch's conscience.1 7 ' Thus, a facially
valid pardon issued by the governor, head of the coequal executive branch,
cannot "be set aside or voided by the judicial branch, based solely on a
claim that the procedural publication requirement of Section 124 was not
me, or that the publication was insufficient."17 ' Finding that this action was
barred by the separation of powers doctrine the court reversed and
remanded. 1o
B. Carlson Concurrence
Justice Carlson, Presiding Justice for the Mississippi Supreme Court,
specially concurred with the majority and was joined by fellow Presiding
Justice Dickinson and Justices Lamar and Chandler.1 8' However, he was
"compelled to write in response to the separate opinions in this case.
Justice Carlson argued that the majority correctly states that "'[t]he con-
trolling issue is whether the judicial branch of government has constitu-
tional authority to void a facially valid pardon issued by the coequal
executive branch, when the only challenge is compliance with Section 124's
publication requirement., 18 ' Furthermore, Justice Carlson was at a loss
for words for how the examples cited by the dissenters of former Missis-
sippi governors executing their pardoning power under Section 124 did not
involve "'interpretation.' "18' The former Mississippi governors referenced
were Governors Williams and Waller and their pardoning of Randall Kelly
Davis.1 85 Davis was charged with two crimes, one of which he was
pardoned for by Governor Williams.18' Then Davis was pardoned for "an-
other crime due to the inability of Governor Williams to pardon Davis on
the second crime because of Governor Williams's belief that Davis had not
175. Id. (quoting Montgomery v. Cleveland, 98 So. 111, 112 (Miss. 1923)) (emphasis omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 413.
179. Id. at 414.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 417 (Carlson, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 414.
183. Id.
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complied with the publication provisions of Section 124."'"' Justice Carl-
son argues that if the court was going to take judicial notice of the actions
of former governors, then what is to stop the court to take judicial notice of
the legislative actions in response to the governors' actions especially the
2012 Legislature action in response to Governor Barbour's actions.1 88
Justice Carlson concluded that the dissenters take issue with Governor
Barbour's interpretation of Section 124 because it was improper compared
to the actions of former Mississippi governors Williams, Waller, and
Mabus.1 8 ' Essentially, as expressed by the majority, the court should
"calmly and unemotionally consider the language of Section 124, as writ-
ten, and interpret the plain language of Section 124" without considering
both the actions of former Governor Barbour and the 2012 Mississippi
Legislature.190 However, Justice Carlson does agree with the dissenters
that "it is [the Mississippi Supreme Court], and not the executive or legisla-
tive branches, which ultimately interprets the provisions of [the Mississippi]
Constitution.""' Thus, Justice Carlson concludes that "[i]f the [Missis-
sippi] Constitution in general, and Section 124 in particular, as currently
written, has produced unintended results, the people may amend it."1 9 2
C. Chandler Concurrence
Justice Chandler specially concurred with the majority and was joined
by Presiding Justices Dickinson and Carlson and Justice Lamar."' Chan-
dler argued that each coequal branch of government "is charged with inter-
preting the procedural provisions of the Constitution applicable to that
branch.""' The Mississippi Supreme Court is to determine "what provi-
sions of the Constitution describe powers that are within the exclusive
sphere of each branch."1 9 5 Chandler believes that Section 124's publication
requirements "are procedural requirements with the executive sphere ...
[and] are not a condition precedent to the governor's power to pardon.""'
Accordingly, Chandler argues that "[t]he fundamental purpose of ... Sec-
tion 124 is to gather information for the governor, who all agree, [pursuant
to the Mississippi Constitution], is vested with the sole discretion to decide
whether to pardon a certain individual.""' Chandler believes that the ma-
jority properly concluded that Section 124's procedural requirements, the
publication requirements, were "within the executive sphere."1 9 8 Justice
Chandler then refutes the dissenters' belief that Section 124's publication
187. Id.
188. Id. at 416.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 416-17.
192. Id. at 417.
193. Id. at 419 (Chandler, J., concurring).




198. Id. at 417-18.
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requirement "is a reservation by the people of a right to thirty days'
notice. "9
Chandler argues that the thirty days' notice right "dissolves when con-
sidered in light of the fact that noticing the public has absolutely no impact
on the governor's decision to pardon."2 0 0 There is no due process right
within Section 124.201 Again, the publication requirements are intended to
benefit the governor in gathering information when deciding on whether or
not to issue a pardon.20
In referencing the majority opinion, Chandler stresses that for the
court to subject a governor's interpretation of Section 124's publication re-
quirements to judicial review, "with [the court's] interpretation to apply
retroactively . . . the court's ability to invalidate pardons would extend to
every pardon that has ever been issued in [Mississippi]."120 Essentially, he
argues that "[t]he details surrounding the publication of applications for
pardons long thought final would be unearthed and subjected to a lengthy
judicial review process [that would take years]."2'0  Responding to the dis-
senters, Chandler argues "every gubernatorial pardon would be subject to
judicial review-not just upon the face of the pardon, but upon evidentiary
inquiries into whether the publication requirement was met to the satisfac-
tion of [the Mississippi Supreme Court]." 05 Chandler states that, under
the Mississippi Constitution, the clemency power is both vested with the
governor and serves as "a check on the judiciary. "206 However, Chandler
argues that had the dissenters' prevailed, "for all practical purposes . . . the
clemency power [would have been placed] with the judiciary."20' There-
fore, Justice Chandler specially concurs with the majority.208
D. Waller Dissent
Chief Justice Waller, joined by Justices Randolph and Pierce, dis-
sented. 09 Citing Pro Choice Mississippi, Waller says "[r]egardless of the
result, [the Mississippi Supreme] Court must enforce the article of the Con-
stitution as written.' 12o The people of Mississippi "did not give the gover-
nor the power to pardon a convicted felon until the felon applying for
pardon 'shall have published for thirty days . . . his petition for pardon,
setting forth therein the reasons why such pardon should be granted."' 11










209. Id. at 420 (Waller, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 419 (quoting Pro Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 652 (Miss. 1998)).
211. Id. at 420.
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Thus, echoing the court's holding in Barbour, Waller says that no Missis-
sippi governor, "or for that matter, any government official, can exercise
power beyond their constitutional authority." 1
Waller argues that the constitutionality of a governor's pardons is justi-
ciable. Relying on Broom, Waller says that "once a governor has acted,
'the legality of the act is a judicial question for the courts.' "1 Therefore,
the Mississippi Supreme Court has a "duty-to determine whether the gov-
ernor, or any government official, has acted outside his or her constitu-
tional authority." 1 5 Thus, Waller respectfully dissents with the majority's




Justice Randolph dissented from the majority and was joined by Chief
Justice Waller and Justice Pierce.21  Randolph argues the judicial branch
has a duty to determine "whether in specific instances the other two
[branches of government] have exceeded the power granted to them by the
Constitution." 1  When there is a clash between the Constitution and the
actions branch of government "the edicts of the [C]onstitution" reign su-
preme.2" Nonetheless, Randolph characterizes the majority opinion as "a
stunning victory for some lawless convicted felons, and an immeasurable
loss for the law-abiding citizens of [Mississippi]."220 Essentially, the
"court[ ] relinquish[ed] the inherent judicial function of declaring what the
[Mississippi] Constitution and our laws say." 1
Randolph strongly argues that the majority holding "allows some con-
victed felons to avoid their constitutional obligations and allows a coordi-
nate branch to eschew multiple constitutional obligations and duties, in
favor of those-convicted felons and in total disregard of substantive consti-
tutional rights reserved by the people of Mississippi."2 This holding an-
nuls the people of Mississippi's right to petition the Government.
Randolph asserts that the majority's decision "contravenes the text of the
Constitution [and] fails to abide by [the Mississippi Supreme] Court's 1924
holding that a pardon petition 'is required by law to be published before
the pardon therein prayed for can be granted . ' Unlike the majority
opinion, Randolph believes that the court's holding in Grantham should
212. Id. (quoting Barbour v. State ex rel. Hood, 974 So. 2d 232, 239 (Miss. 2008)).
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Broom v. Henry, 100 So. 602, 603 (Miss. 1924)).
215. Id. (quoting Barbour, 974 So. 2d at 239).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 439 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 420-21 (citing Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 803 (Miss. 1938)).








control In re Hooker.]' In Grantham, the court held that "'Section 124 ...
requires all petitions for the pardon of a felon to be published' and that 'it
is required by law to be published before the pardon therein prayed for can
be granted ..... Overall, Randolph is perplexed by "the majority's
acquiescence to [the] untenable accretion of judicial authority to the execu-
tive branch ....
Agreeing with Chief Justice Waller, Randolph asserts that "the plain
language of [Section 124's] text still must control [the court's] decision, for
[the] court must declare the Mississippi Constitution as it is written, not as
[the court] assume[s] it to be."2 Relying on Delta Correctional Facility
Authority, Randolph says that "[t]he ultimate power and responsibility for
interpreting [the Mississippi] Constitution is bestowed upon the judiciary,
and that responsibility is the crux of [In re Hooker]."2' Governor Bar-
bour's actions are justiciable because the pardons he issued were outside
his constitutional authority as governor. 3 0
Randolph notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has found the reviews of
pardons justiciable. 1  Therefore, he argues that "when the State contro-
verts a pardon, as here, the courts have a duty to expound upon it."'31 Like
Chief Justice Waller, Randolph argues that the majority "relinquishes the
constitutional question to the governor, and then concludes that the gover-
nor's decision is not reviewable by a court." Randolph questions this
action because "[t]here is no textual commitment to the executive branch
for the interpretation of the [Mississippi] Constitution." The Mississippi
Supreme Court "lacks the authority to cede power bestowed upon it by the
people ....
Randolph reiterates that the pardoning power exists only to the extent
that the people have constitutionally granted it.' 6  Relying on McPhail,
Randolph argues that court "cannot know with certitude the framers' in-
tent in placing limitation in the text of the Constitution, but we can with
certitude view the express words used in the framers' textual commitment
to publication, and know with certitude that the Constitution means what
the words say."' 3 7 He states that "Mississippians did not bestow upon the
governor an unconditional grant of authority to pardon [, but rather limit
225. Id. at 429.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 423.
228. Id.
229. Id at 423-24 (citing Barbour v. Delta Corr. Facility Auth., 871 So. 2d 703, 710 (Miss. 2004)).
230. Id. at 424.





236. Id. at 426.
237. Id. (citing State v. McPhail, 180 So. 387, 389 (Miss. 1938)).
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the governor's pardon authority through constitutionally enumerated limi-
tations stated in Section 124]."932 Echoing Waller, Randolph asserts that
"before a governor may pardon a convicted felon, the felon 'shall' publish
his petition for thirty days [pursuant to Section 124] before any 'pardon
shall be granted ..... ' In other words, the governor is powerless to
grant a pardon in absence of Section 124's publication requirements and if
he proceeds to issue the pardon then the legality of that pardon is
justiciable.240
Randolph laments that "[n]o citation is required for the general princi-
ple that excising a provision from and-reading nonexistent language pre-
cluding judicial review into-Section 124 violates all tenets that govern
constitutional interpretation." 41  The majority would have prevented the
presence of uncertainties and legal morass in this case if they had simply
adhered to the existing language of Section 124. Randolph respectfully
dissents from the majority's view that the governor has free reign to wield
the pardoning power.
F Pierce Dissent
Justice Pierce dissented from the majority and was joined by Chief
Justice Waller and Justice Randolph.4 Pierce states that this case is "sim-
ply an analysis of words and a determination of the legal meaning.4 The
language of Section 124 "is neither hard to apply nor difficult to under-
stand."'46 However, in light of the majority's decision, Pierce argues that
"Section 124 will forever be waiting-its words never judicially
determined. "947
Furthermore, Pierce asserts that the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the Mississippi government "owe their existence to the Missis-
sippi Constitution."4 8 All the branches are coequal, "[and] by duty and
necessity, the obligation of determining whether, in specific instances, one
of the [branches] has exceeded the powers granted to it, 'devolves' upon
the judiciary." 4 1 Pierce believes that it is an untenable position for the
majority to hold "whether the constitutional strictures of Section 124 were
met . . . nonjusticiable."25 o He concludes that "the majority has effectively
countenanced a view that almost any interpretation the executive or legis-
lative [branches] may give to the Mississippi Constitution-no matter how
238. Id. at 427.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 428.
242. Id. at 439.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 444 (Pierce, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 439.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 440.
249. Id. (citing Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 803 (Miss. 1938)) (Pierce, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 442.
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erroneous-is now binding on the judiciary." 1 5  This is a road that Pierce
does not want to travel, and, therefore, he respectfully dissents.
V. ANALYSIS
The idea "[t]hat great constitutional and legal questions may become
topics of political and even partisan controversy should never be employed
by [the judiciary] as an excuse to duck its responsibility to adjudicate the
legal and constitutional rights of the parties." 25  The political question doc-
trine asserts "that there exist certain issues of constitutional law that are
more effectively resolved by the political branches of government and are
therefore inappropriate for judicial resolution." 5  Political questions are
declared "'non-justiciable,' which means that the courts will neither ap-
prove nor reject the judgments of the political branches, and will instead let
the political process take its course."5 Governor Barbour's actions were
deemed "political" because the In re Hooker court viewed the constitution-
ally explicit publication requirement as a procedural matter reserved to the
internal operations of Mississippi's executive branch .2 6 Reading the textu-
ally committed publication requirement out of the Mississippi Constitution,
the In re Hooker court has left the impression that the coequal nature of
Mississippi's government is imbalanced.
The political question doctrine provides courts the "'means to avoid
passing on the merits of a question when reaching the merits would force
the [judiciary] to compromise an important principle or would undermine
the [judiciary's] authority.' "-5 It "does not generally relieve the courts of
authority over cases where decisions of the political branches are chal-
lenged." 25  Under the political question doctrine, the judiciary is required
"to avoid reviewing the decisions of the political bodies where the Consti-
tution has explicitly granted to them complete discretion over the subject
matter." 5 ' Furthermore, "the class of issues where final authority is
granted to political branches includes questions which are not in and of
themselves 'political'; rather they are deemed 'political' because they re-
present the exercise of discretion delegated to political actors."210 In
Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court established certain formulations that define
a political question.
251. Id. at 443-44.
252. Id. at 444.
253. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 339 (Miss. 1987).
254. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the 'Political Question', 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031
(1984).
255. Id.
256. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 414.
257. Marcella David, Passport to Justice. Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Ap-
plication in the World Court, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 129 (1999) (citing LATRENCE H. TRIBE, ANIERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 96 (2d ed. 1988)).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 130.
260. Id.
261. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
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The presence of a political question is indicated when:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.7
The judiciary has also considered military matters and foreign relations as
political questions 6  There is also an external operation versus internal
operation dichotomy to the political question inquiry. Regarding chal-
lenges to the internal operations of a coequal branch of government, "the
application of the political question doctrine may . . . require the courts to
stay their hand."'62 The Baker formulations "speak to legal, prudential and
functional issues associated with the exercise of jurisdiction in certain cir-
cumstances. "1 65 The first Baker formulation "looks to the constitutional
limitations on the power granted the courts . .. [and] the second addresses
prudential concerns .. 6. The remaining four Baker formulations speak
to judicial review of coequal branch decisions."2
A. The Baker factors applied to hI re Hooker
1. The Textual Commitment
Nixon is a seminal case in the U.S. Supreme Court political question
jurisprudence with respect to the textual commitment of constitutional au-
thority. [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department" is indicative of a political
question.26 1 In Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court held Judge Nixon's allega-
tions that the United States Senate conducted an improper impeachment
trial as nonjusticiable pursuant to the political question doctrine.2'6  The
262. Id, see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (addressing whether seating a U.S.
Congressman-elect in the House of Representatives after the passing of a resolution excluding the
member-elect was a political question); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (discussing whether
the proper way of exiting treaties entered into by the United States is a political question).
263. David, supra note 257, at 130.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 128.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
269. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993).
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matter of trying impeachments was "'a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to [the legislative branch with respect to the
U.S. Senate] . . . .'270 This is an external limitation on judicial review.
In Nixon, the Court asserted that the "Senate alone shall have author-
ity to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or con-
victed." 1  The Senate was "trying" Judge Nixon's impeachment with a
committee of Senators. * Impeachment trials are political questions and
are nonjusticiable.2" As long as the Senate is operating within its Consti-
tutional sphere, the judiciary cannot "open[ ] the door of judicial review to
the [internal] procedures used by the Senate in trying impeach-
ments . . . . " Above all, "[i]f the courts may review the actions of the
Senate in order to determine whether [it] 'tried' an impeached official, it is
difficult to see how the Senate would be 'functioning . . . independently
[from the judiciary]."2 5 Nixon exemplifies how the political question doc-
trine was not applicable to hI re Hooker.
The Barbour pardons were validated on the assertion that Barbour
executed the textually committed pardoning power that is constitutionally
vested within the Governor of Mississippi.7 However, the In re Hooker
court's textual commitment argument is flawed. The plain language of the
constitutional provisions at issue in Nixon and in In re Hooker are distin-
guishable.2 In Nixon, pursuant to United States Constitution Article 1,
Section 3, Clause 6, the United States Senate has "the power to try im-
peachments without limitation, exception, or specific requirements for its
exercise by the Senate." " However, with respect to the pardoning power
of Mississippi governors, Article 5, "Section 124 [of the Mississippi Consti-
tution] places three limitations on the pardon power: (1) the Senate must
consent to a pardon for treason; (2) no pardon shall be granted before con-
viction; and (3) a felon requesting a pardon must publish a petition for
thirty days before the pardon shall be granted." 7
In hI re Hooker, a political question would have been present had
Governor Barbour's actions complied with "a textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment of the [pardoning power] to [the] coordinate [exec-
utive branch]."2s0  However, within those constitutional textual
commitments are the enumerated constitutional limitations to issuing a
pardon like the thirty day publication requirement that was absent from
Barbour's pardons.21 ' Governor Barbour's pardons were a "pardon" in
270. Id. at 228 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
271. Id. at 231.
272. Id. at 230.
273. Id. at 238.
274. Id. at 236.
275. Id. at 231.
276. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 414 (Miss. 2012).
277. Id. at 434 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 6).
279. Id. at 412; Miss. CONST. art. V, §124 (1890).
280. Id. at 405; Miss. CONST. art. V, §124 (1890).
281. Miss. CONST. art. V, §124 (1890).
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name only because they were not constitutionally valid for failing to com-
ply with the thirty day publication requirement. All in all, thirty days is
thirty days.
2. The Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards
The judiciary is "underequipped to formulate national polices or de-
velop standards for matters not legal in nature." 8 2 In Japan Whaling, sev-
eral wildlife conservation groups challenged the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce's failure "to certify that Japan's whaling practices 'diminish the
effectiveness' of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing [(IRCW)] because [Japan's] annual harvest exceed[ed] quotas estab-
lished under the [IRCW]."28 ' The Secretary's certification was alleged to
be mandated by the Pelly and Packwood Amendments enacted by the U.S.
Congress to amend the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 and the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act respectively.28 ' The
Japanese petitioners argued that the issue was a nonjusticiable political
question because it touched on foreign relations.m
The Japan Whaling Court did acknowledge the prominent role that
both the executive and legislative branches play in United States foreign
policy. 8 6 However, there were judicial standards readily available in this
case-the legislative amendments. Determining whether certification was
required by the Secretary called for the Court to "apply[] no more than the
traditional rules of statutory construction, and then apply[] this analysis to
the particular set of facts presented below."' 8 7 Despite the probability that
its "decision may have significant political overtones," the Court engaged
in the judiciary's traditional role of statutory interpretation.
As in Japan Whaling, there was no "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" in hI re Hooker to determine the validity of the
controversial Barbour pardons.m In re Hooker contained judicial author-
ity, a constitutional amendment to the Mississippi Constitution. Article 5,
Section 124 of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution unequivocally and unam-
biguously states that the Governor of Mississippi is constitutionally vested
to issue pardons, but those pardons are subject to constitutionally enumer-
ated restrictions that includes a thirty-day publication requirement.
282. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (quoting U.S. ex rel.
Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F. 2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
283. Id. at 223.
284. Id. at 225-26.
285. Id. at 229.
286. Id. at 230.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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3. Judicial Refrain from Determining Policy
Again, the last four Baker factors "collectively speak to [the constitu-
tional] limitations of court review of certain legislative and executive deci-
sions."210 Nonjusticiable political questions are "those controversies which
revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally
committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the
Executive Branch." ' 1  Generally, this involves the realm of foreign af-
fairs. * Granted, not every foreign relations issue is a political question.
Nevertheless, foreign relations "frequently turn on standards that defy ju-
dicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably com-
mitted to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely
demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views. *2
Aktepe v. United States29 5 concerned tort suits brought by Turkish
sailors against the United States for personal injuries and deaths sustained
in a multi-national naval exercise that included the United States Navy. 6
However, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case as a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question because the issue centered on foreign relations and would re-
quire the judiciary to engage in "initial policy decisions of a kind
appropriately reserved for military discretion" like simulated battlefield
conditions. 9 The "courts are unschooled in 'the delicacies of diplomatic
negotiation [and] the inevitable bargaining for the best solution of an inter-
national conflict, the Constitution entrusts resolution of sensitive foreign
policy issues to the political branches of government." 9  In the realm of
foreign relations, the judiciary "is neither equipped nor, more importantly,
constitutionally empowered to speak. -
Unlike Aktepe, hI re Hooker was not a matter of foreign relations or
national security. It did not involve policy regarding United States foreign
affairs or United States military operations. 3 00 Rather, In re Hooker solely
concerned a Mississippi matter about whether controversial pardons issued
by its governor were valid absent a constitutionally explicit publication
requirement.o1
290. David, supra note 257, at 128.
291. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230.
292. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997).
296. Id. at 1401-02.
297. Id. at 1404.
298. Id. at 1403 (quoting Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d. 195, 199 (4th Cir.) (quoting Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1973))).
299. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F. 3d 548, 563 (5th Cir. 2008).
300. In re Hooker, 87 So.3d 401, 403-04 (Miss. 2012).
301. Id.
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B. Marbury and Powell v. McCormack
One could argue that hI re Hooker mirrors Marbury. In hI re Hooker,
Governor Barbour failed to adhere to the Section 124 publication require-
ment, but the Mississippi Supreme Court did not compel the governor to
comply with the requirement compared to Marbury where Secretary
Madison was required to deliver Marbury's commission yet was not com-
pelled to deliver it by the Marshall Court.3 0 2 However, In re Hooker is not
analogous to Marbury.
In Marbury, the Marshall Court did not compel Madison to deliver
Marbury's commission because the statute, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, that afforded Marbury the remedy to a writ of mandamus against
Madison by the U.S. Supreme Court was unconstitutional.3 03 Section 13
expanded the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to include the issuance
of writs of mandamus, which Marshall held was repugnant to the U.S. Con-
stitution.3 0 ' Marshall asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court's original juris-
diction, which is explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution, does not include
issuing writs of mandamus.3 05 Original jurisdiction could only be expanded
through a constitutional amendment and not through an act of Congress.30
Unlike Marbury, in hI re Hooker there was not a constitutionally repug-
nant statute that prevented the Mississippi Supreme Court from nullifying
Governor Barbour's pardons, but rather the textually committed constitu-
tional restrictions to the Mississippi Governor's pardoning power laid out
in Section 124.
The hI re Hooker court held that the judiciary could not nullify par-
dons issued by the governor when the only claim was the pardon's noncom-
pliance with Section 124's publication requirement even though the
majority said that the publication requirement must be met. 0 7 The par-
dons were nonjusticiable as they were political in nature.3 0 s In essence, the
Mississippi Supreme Court broadened the political question doctrine to
veil a coequal branch's actions trespassing its constitutional sphere as polit-
ical and not subject to judicial review.
Marshall exclaimed that "[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court."0 9 Therefore "without constitutional authority to issue
a pardon until after publication, the matter was not constitutionally 'sub-
mitted to the executive,' such that [Governor Barbour] had no discretion to
302. Id. at 414; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,173-74 (1803).
303. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170-80.
304. Id. at 173-80.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 412.
308. Id. at 411-12, 414.
309. Id. at 405.
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exercise." 1 o The Mississippi Governor's pardon restrictions are constitu-
tionally explicit.3 11 Barbour's actions were repugnant to the Mississippi
Constitution and not political. Accordingly, unlike Marbury, In re Hooker
is analogous to Powell.
Powell challenged the United States House of Representatives refusal
to seat Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., duly elected by the voters of the 18th
Congressional District of New York, in the 90th U.S. Congress. 31 2 During
the 89th Congress, the House Committee on Education and Labor was in-
vestigated for the expenditures of that committee during Powell's chair-
manship. The report surrounding the investigation concluded that
Powell had engaged in improper expenditures including deceiving House
authorities about travel expenses and "certain illegal salary payments . .. to
Powell's wife at his discretion." 1 4 However, no formal disciplinary action
was taken against Powell and he was subsequently elected to the 90th
Congress.315
At the beginning of the 90th Congress, House leaders attempted
through procedural resolutions to exclude Powell from taking his seat in
the House of Representatives. 3 16 The House adopted House Resolution
No. 1 that established "a Select Committee to determine Powell's eligibil-
ity." 17 The Committee found that Powell had met the standing qualifica-
tions of Article 1, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which states
that "[n]o Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen." 3 " The Committee also reaffirmed that Powell
engaged in improper expenditures and recommended to the full House
that Powell be seated but fined, censured, and stripped of seniority.
However, the Committee's resolution was rejected by the House but was
later amended by the House to call for Powell's exclusion.3 20 The amended
resolution was adopted by the House "excluding Powell and directing the
Speaker [of the House] to notify the Governor of New York that the seat
was vacant." 3 1 Powell brought suit against House leaders including John
310. Id. at 433 (citing Marburv, 5 U.S. at 170) (Randolph, J., dissenting).
311. Miss. CONST. art. V, § 124 (1890).
312. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489-495 (1969).
313. Id. at 489-90.
314. Id. at 490.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 489-94.
317. Id. at 490.
318. Id. at 492: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 492-93.
321. Id. at 493.
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W. McCormack, the Speaker of the House, challenging the exclusion's con-
stitutionality. 12 The U.S. Supreme Court held that this issue was not a
nonjusticiable political question.
The House argued that Powell's claim presented a political question
because "there has been a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment' to the House of the 'adjudicatory power' to determine Powell's qual-
ifications. " However, Powell argued that "the 'qualifications' expressly
set forth in the Constitution were not meant to limit the long-recognized
legislative power to exclude . . . at will, but merely to establish 'standing
incapacities,' which could be altered only by a constitutional amend-
ment." " In essence, the House decides whether a duly elected member
satisfied the qualifications, "but . .. as to what these qualifications consisted
of [is] not [at the House's discretion]."3 2' Accordingly, the Court agreed
with Powell and held that a U.S. Representative-elect, "duly elected by his
[or her] constituents . . . and meets all the requirements for membership
expressly prescribed in the Constitution," cannot be excluded by the
House.3 21 Powell was entitled to be seated in the 90th Congress. 3 21
As with Powell, hI re Hooker concerned a coequal branch of govern-
ment's attempt to redefine its textually-committed constitutional authority.
However, unlike the House of Representatives, Governor Barbour was
successful. In Powell, the Court found that the House's internal proce-
dures were subject to judicial review since it attempted to alter the external
constitutionally explicit qualifications for member-elects as a way to ex-
clude Congressman Powell from taking his seat in the 90th Congress.
The only way the House could change the qualifications for one to serve in
the U.S. House of Representatives was through a constitutional amend-
ment.3 30 Similarly, in hI re Hooker, Governor Barbour executed his consti-
tutionally vested pardoning power that was conditioned on constitutionally
explicit restrictions.3
Pursuant to the 1890 Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, "Section
124 ... a felon requesting a pardon must publish a petition for thirty days
before the pardon shall be granted." 33  The controversial pardons at issue
in hI re Hooker were granted by Governor Barbour void of the thirty-day
publication requirement despite the In re Hooker majority's declaration
that the publication requirement had to be met. The only way for Gov-
ernor Barbour to waive the thirty-day publication requirement was through
322. Id.
323. Id. at 550.
324. Id. at 519 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1).
325. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522.
326. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (distinguishing Powell from the issue in Nixon).
327. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522.
328. Id. at 550.
329. Id. at 522, 550.
330. Id. at 522.
331. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 402-03 (Miss. 2012).
332. Id. at 412; Miss. CONST. art. V, § 124.
333. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 412, 414.
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an amendment to the Mississippi Constitution."' However, despite the
blatant violation of the Mississippi Governor's pardoning power's external
constitutional restrictions, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Gover-
nor Barbour's actions were political nature of the executive branch's inter-
nal procedures and nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.
C. External Limitations vs. Internal Procedures Dichotomy
As illustrated through Nixon and Powell, there are external limitations
to judicial review versus subjecting the internal procedures of a coequal
branch to judicial review dichotomy embedded within the political question
doctrine. Generally, the Baker factors and matters concerning foreign rela-
tions act as external factors to judicial review. If a coordinate coequal
branch's actions comply with Baker or touch foreign relations, the coequal
branch's actions will be deemed political and nonjusticiable. However, if
the coequal branch's actions trespass its sphere of constitutional authority,
the coequal branch's actions are no longer political and its internal opera-
tions are subject to judicial review. In Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the U.S. Senate was the absolute and sole trier of impeachments in-
cluding trying impeachments through a committee of Senators. 6 There-
fore, the Nixon Court refused to entertain Judge Nixon's request for a new
impeachment trial and subject the U.S. Senate's internal procedures for
conducting impeachment trials to judicial review. 3 Conversely, in Powell,
the U.S. Supreme Court viewed the U.S. House's actions in trying to ex-
clude a duly elected member through procedural resolutions as violating
the constitutional qualifications stated in Article 1, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution. " The U.S. House's defiance of its textually committed con-
stitutional authority rendered the Powell Court to subject the U.S. House's
internal procedures to judicial review. 3 In In re Hooker, the Mississippi
Supreme Court disheveled the external versus internal dichotomy.
The hI re Hooker court holding that "the governor alone ... decide[s]
whether the [Mississippi] Constitution's publication requirement enables
future governors unprecedented wield of the pardoning power amidst an
emboldened executive and a weakened judiciary."340 Unlike the Nixon
Court, the In re Hooker court blurred the lines between the external consti-
tutional limits and subjecting the internal coequal branch's procedures to
judicial review. The Mississippi Supreme Court equated Section 124's pub-
lication requirement as an internal operation of the executive branch." 1
However, the Section 124's thirty-day publication requirement and the
other restrictions on the Governor's pardon authority are not internalized
334. Id. at 417 (Carlson, J., concurring); see also Miss. CONST. art. XV, § 273.
335. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 412, 414.
336. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-36; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
337. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
338. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522, 550 (1969).
339. Id. at 550.
340. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 403.
341. Id. at 403, 412, 414.
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but rather constitutionally explicit. 1 Conversely, In re Hooker expanded
the political question doctrine to read the thirty-day publication require-
ment out of the constitution.
Article 5, Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution states that "no
pardon shall be granted until the applicant therefor [sic] shall have pub-
lished for thirty days . . . ." However, Governor Barbour issued pardons
that did not comply with the constitutionally explicit thirty-day publication
requirement; yet, his constitutional violation was declared nonjusticiable as
it was political in nature.4 Contrary to Powell and despite the external
violation, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not subject the executive
branch's internal operations regarding Barbour's controversial pardons to
judicial review.3 44
D. Political Overtones are not always Political Questions
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphatically asserted that "[t]he pres-
ence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not
automatically invoke the political question doctrine." 4 Undeniably, hI re
Hooker was engulfed with political overtones as evident through the par-
ties and other players involved with its adjudication. hI re Hooker was
initiated by Democratic Mississippi Attorney General, Jim Hood, 3 4  and
eventually involved Republican Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour and
Barbour's successor, Republican Governor Phil Bryant.34 ' Also, five of the
ten pardonees served as trustees at the Mississippi Governor's Mansion
during the Barbour Administration.4 Furthermore, hI re Hooker was ad-
judicated before the elected Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court.4
Nevertheless, these political overtones were not dispositive that In re
Hooker raised a nonjusticiable political question.
The judiciary's political question doctrine, as exhibited in In re
Hooker, has the potential to harbor a "'realpolitik"' view that "the [judici-
ary] must survive in an often hostile political world, and the best way to
accomplish that feat and simultaneously maintain its legitimacy is to pick
342. Miss. CONST. art, V, § 124.
343. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 414.
344. Id.
345. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983).
346. Jim Hood, Mississippi, DENIOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.
democraticags.org/jim.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
347. Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 13, at *49; Mississippi Governor Haley Bar-
bour, NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-governors-
bios/page-mississippi/col2-content/main-content-list/haley-barbour.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013); Mis-
sissippi Governor Phil Brvant, National Governors Association, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/gover-
nors/current-governors/col2-content/main-content-list/governor-phil-bryant.htmi (last visited Nov. 4,
2013).
348. Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 13, at *7-8.
349. About the Courts, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JTDICIARY, http://courts.ms.gov/aboutcourts/about
courts.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
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fights."o5 0 However, this view is not dispositive to allow a court to disre-
gard a case because it is embedded with politics. 51 The Baker Court ac-
knowledged that "the doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions,' not one of 'political cases.' " 5 Political matters are ubiquitous
throughout the federal docket.3 53
The judiciary's interpretation of the law "will sometimes involve the
i[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of
the three branches,' but courts cannot avoid their responsibility merely 'be-
cause the issues have political implications.' 3 Although the In re
Hooker court cited the political question doctrine for nonjusticiability of
the Barbour pardons, when legal issues "sound in familiar principles of
constitutional interpretation . .. [t]he political question doctrine poses no
bar to judicial review." 35 5 As in In re Hooker, when the head of the coe-
qual executive branch, like the Governor of Mississippi, exceeds the consti-
tutional sphere of executive power, the question is no longer political but
rather constitutional, requiring judicial review.
E. The Political Question Doctrine Veil
In re Hooker is a vivid reminder of the implications of a state judiciary
misinterpreting and subsequently broadening the political question doc-
trine, making the fundamental notion of the coequal separation of powers
appear imbalanced. There is absolutely no United States Governor that
"can exercise power beyond their constitutional authority." 356  The In re
Hooker majority conceded that the constitutional explicit publication re-
quirements stated in section 124 have to be met. 3 5  Nevertheless, it still
held that "a facially valid pardon, issued by the governor . .. may not be set
aside or voided by the judicial branch, based solely on a claim that the
"1351
procedural publication requirement of Section 124 was not met ....
The Governor of Mississippi's "pardoning power is an enumerated power
of the [Mississippi] Constitution and . . . its limitations, if any, must be
found in the [Mississippi] Constitution itself." 3 5  Governor Barbour was
constitutionally vested to issue pardons, but "no pardon shall be granted
until the applicant therefor shall have published for thirty days . ... "360
The pardons at issue in hI re Hooker were indeed pardons, but they were
unconstitutional, null, and void in the absence of complying with the ex-
plicit and constitutionally enumerated thirty-day publication requirement.
350. Redish, supra note 254, at 1031.
351. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
352. Id.
353. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JTRISDICTION 143 (2d. ed. 1994).
354. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012).
355. Id. at 1430
356. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 420 (quoting Barbour v. State ex rel. Hood, 974 So. 2d 232, 239
(Miss. 2008)) (Waller, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 403, 412. (majority opinion).
358. Id. at 414.
359. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
360. Miss. CONST. art, V, § 124.
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In In re Hooker, an explicit constitutional limitation was veiled in the
political question doctrine and rendered nonjusticiable. Subsequently, in
light of In re Hooker, how far can the political question doctrine veil be
draped over either executive or legislative branch actions to render the en-
tire breadth of their authority nonjusticiable? State courts, especially
popularly elected state judiciaries like Mississippi,"' should be hesitant to
broaden the political question doctrine to cover actions outside a coequal
branch's constitutional sphere of power.
William Howard Taft, former President of the United States, "declared
that judicial elections were 'disgraceful' and 'so shocking . . . that we ought
to condemn them." 3 6  There is a perceived notion that "increased competi-
tiveness of [judicial] elections has . . . heightened the pressure on judges to
decide cases strategically" at the expense of judicial independence."' Iron-
ically, "contested judicial elections introduce a partisan, ideological compo-
nent into the branch of government that, at least in theory, is supposed to
be 'above politics." 36 Unequivocally, "[t]he goal of the judicial process is
to provide impartial justice to all litigants who come before the
courts . . . .65
In re Hooker was decided by justices who "'are selected in highly parti-
san circumstances and depend upon a highly partisan constituency for con-
tinuance in office, they may act in ways which will cultivate support for that
constituency, that is, exhibit tendencies in their judicial decision mak-
ing.' "366 Unfortunately, the elected Mississippi Supreme Court's In re
Hooker holding has made all the difference in the world to Governor Bar-
bour's successors and their now unprecedented constitutional authority to
interpret and wield their pardoning power in the absence of the Mississippi
Supreme Court. If state judiciaries, including Mississippi, post-Iz re
Hooker, continue to misinterpret and broaden the political question doc-
trine to the point that executive or legislative action is immune from judi-
cial review, "then [the judiciary will] be transformed from the guardian
of . . . separation of powers [the judiciary] has long recognized into mere
wishful thinking. "361
VI. CONCLUSION
In re Hooker serves as a model for other state judiciaries in assessing
their political question jurisprudences. It is imperative that state judiciaries
361. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUTKE L.J. 1589, 1596 (2009).
362. Id. at 1601.
363. Id. at 1603.
364. John L. Dodd, The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 353, 368 (2002).
365. Id. at 374.
366. Id. at 375; About the Courts, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JUTDICIARY, http://courts.ms.gov/about
courts/aboutcourts.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
367. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2598 (2011).
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"cautiously invoke[]" the political question doctrine."' Otherwise, as evi-
dent with hI re Hooker, misconstruing the political question doctrine could
lead to an explicit, textually committed constitutional requirement being
read directly out of a state's constitution. The judiciary must remain vigi-
lant and "mindful that the purpose of the political question doctrine is to
bar claims that have the potential to undermine the separation-of-powers
design of our federal government." 6 ' The judiciary branch cannot un-
equivocally "acquiesce[] to [the] untenable accretion of judicial authority
to the executive branch . . . ."370 In re Hooker lends credence to the per-
ception that Mississippi's coequal branches of government are imbalanced
and has put Mississippi on a path to witness post-Barbour governorships
that have free reign in wielding the pardoning power in the absence of the
Mississippi judiciary.
Governor Haley Barbour was undeniably a political force within the
state of Mississippi. However, his actions as the Governor of Mississippi,
the head of the coequal executive branch, in issuing the hI re Hooker par-
dons were not political in nature, but rather a question of constitutional law
that required judicial review. As long as coequal branches act pursuant to
their constitutional powers, their actions are deemed political and are non-
justiciable. However, when the branches pierce their constitutional sphere
of power their actions are no longer political but are subject to judicial
review. Accordingly, the judiciary cannot broaden the meaning of the po-
litical question doctrine to include a coequal branch's unconstitutional ac-
tions because it would lead to potentiality unfettered executive or
legislative authority.
368. Dodd, supra note 363, at 376-75 (citing Can v. United States, 14 F. 3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.
1994)).
369. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F. 3d 548, 559 (5th Cir.).
370. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 423 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
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